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The Russian-Ukraine gas supply crisis in January
2009 brought an unprecedented disruption for the gas
supply in Europe. As a response, the SoS Regulation
put in place an ambitious plan to mitigate not only the
risks of another gas supply crisis, but also to protect a
defined group of customers in case of unavoidable gas
shortage ± households, small and medium enterprises,
institutions providing essential social services among
others. While it was thought the SoS Regulation had
pursued exhaustive harmonization standards in the
definition of protected costumers, the ECJ's judgment
in Eni and Others reopened the question. This article,
instead, argues that the Court got it wrong. Neither
the judgment nor the opinion of the Advocate General
took into sufficient account the legal content Fof the
provision that defined protected customers. If the
Court had done so, the judgment would have likely
taken additional linguistic, systemic, and teleological
arguments into account. The analyses and comments
on Eni and Others here offered focus on the first
referred question about whether Member States could
impose additional obligation on gas undertakings by
reviewing the definition of protected customer.
I. Introduction
If a larger gas pipeline endures a severe disruption in a
bitterly cold winter, as households, we will continue
living our lives with no impact on our heating systems or
gas ovens. This is thanks to the SoS Regulation1
approved in the aftermath of the major Russia-Ukraine
gas supply crisis in January 2009. While the interruption
in the flow of gas to the EU from Russia via Ukraine
produced a major shortage of heating fuel, the SoS
Regulation put in place an ambitious plan to mitigate
not only the risks of another gas supply crisis, but also
to protect citizens in case of unavoidable gas shortage.
Citizens who shivered in the bitter cold winter of 2009
ought to be thereafter protected customers, namely,
customers entitled to the right for an uninterrupted gas
supply contract in a crisis. But who should be entitled to
the status of protected customer: households, hospitals,
small enterprises, or public offices? Though it was
believed that the SoS Regulation had answered this
question exhaustively, the judgement of the European
Court of Justice in Eni and Others2 reopened the issue.
We, as households, are necessarily protected custo-
mers. Small and medium enterprises, essential social
services, and district heating systems might be entitled,
to the extent that Member States chose to include
them to the definition of protected customer. Eni and
Others, nevertheless, recognizes Member States' dis-
cretion to extend protection to customers other than
those listed in the SoS Regulation. While the judge-
ment could be perceived as a challenge to precedents at
ECJ on provisions to be regard as exhaustive
harmonization standards, this case note argues the
contrary.
The reasoning of Eni and Others will be analysed to
inquire whether the Court actually got it wrong.3 The
analyses and comments then focus on the first referred
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1 The SoS Regulation entered into force in March 2011 by
the approval of Regulation 994/2010 and was recently
replaced by Regulation 2017/1938. Despite the legal reform,
the legal provisions at issue in c have not been subject to
substantive legal reform. Therefore, Eni and Others is still a
relevant case for the interpretation of the regulatory
framework now in force. All the references to the SoS
Regelation hereafter should be understood as referring to
provisions in both EU regulations concerning measures to
safeguard security of gas supply: Regulation (EU) No994/
2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20
October 2010 concerning measures to safeguard security of
gas supply and repealing Council Directive 2004/67/EC, OJ
L 295, 12.11.2010, and Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 of 25
October 2017 concerning measures to safeguard the security
of gas supply and repealing Regulation (EU) No 994/2010,
OJ L 280, 28.10.2017.
2 Case C-226/16, Eni and Others v Premier Ministre and
Ministre de l'Environnement, de l'EÂnergie et de la Mer,
Judgement of the Court (First Chamber) of 20 December
2017, EU:C:2017:1005.
3 ``When the Court gets it wrong'' is a reference to the
remarkable two-term seminar given by Prof. JHH Weiler
entitled ``When the Court gets it wrong: reviewing the
fundamentally wrong cases from the ECJ'' at the European
University Institute along the academic year 2014-2015.
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question about whether Member States could impose
additional obligation on gas undertakings by review-
ing the definition of protected customer. In so doing, a
broader perspective of the issue is provided. The
arguments are divided in three parts. The first part
(5.1) recalls the context in which the SoS Regulation
was approved, but does so by emphasising the moral
justification behind the regulatory choice of protecting
a specific group of customers in circumstances of
scarcity. The second part (5.2) sheds lights on the
provisions defining ``protected costumers'' to show
how the definition could be perceived as an exhaustive
harmonization standard from linguistic, systemic, and
teleological arguments. The third part (5.3) compares
those legal arguments to the reasoning pursued by the
ECJ.
II. Factual and Legal Background
The case was triggered by two applications before the
Conseil d'EÂtat against the French State. The first
application was brought on 12 May 2014 by Eni SpA
and Eni Gas & Power France SA (together, Eni). Eni
is a natural gas supplier providing services to a wide
range of customers located in France ± from large
customers as power stations, industries, and heating
providers to small business customers and households.
On 14 May 2014, the Union Professionnelle des
Industries PriveÂ es du Gaz (Uprigaz) filed the second
application on behalf of the class of private industries
operating in the French market for natural gas.
In the two applications, Eni and Uprigaz claimed,
inter alia, that the French Decree 2014-328 was adopted
ultra vires. For them, the Ministre de l'enviroment, de
l'eÂ nergie et de la mer enacted a set of rules that
improperly reviewed the definition of ``protected custo-
mers'' as established by the SoS Regulation. As a result,
the Decree granted a larger group of customers with the
right to claim protected customer status, which implied
additional obligations to Eni and Uprigaz's members,
and indeed all gas suppliers operating in France. These
additional obligations were what prompted actions from
Eni and Uprigaz.
To understand Eni and Others, one has to keep in
mind that the core legal issue at stake was whether the
definition of protected customer within the SoS
Regulation was to be treated as exhaustive or whether
Member States were accorded a margin of discretion
to amend it in light of the regulation. A broader
contextualization of the SoS Regulation is needed to
apprehend the concept of protected customer, the
obligation on gas suppliers implied by this status, and
the additional protective measures implemented by
Decree 2014-328.
The SoS Regulation entered into force in March
2011. Since then, all suppliers of natural gas, including
Eni and Uprigaz' members, have been obliged to
ensure an uninterrupted supply of gas to a group of
customers defined as ``protected customers'' in gas
supply crisis situations. This specific obligation born
from the undertakings is named the ``supply standard''
and is to be understood as a mandatory contractual
rule between gas suppliers and protected customers. In
the provision that describes the supply standard,4
paragraph (1) establishes in detail the conditions
under which gas undertakings have to perform the
obligation of providing an uninterrupted gas supply;
namely, the disruption of gas flow or exceptionally
high demand.5 Paragraph (2), instead, determines the
conditions under which a Member State can increase
the supply standard to exceed the 30-day period of
continuous supply, or impose additional obligations
on gas undertakings for security of supply.
Whilst the terms and conditions of the obligation to
protected customers is written in provisions about
supply standards, the definition of protected customer
is established in the list of definitions within the SoS
Regulation. Protected customers necessarily include
all households connected to the distribution network.6
This means that we, as households, are entitled to
continue heating our rooms or use our gas stove even
if a large pipeline undergoes cut-off. In addition, the
EU legislator allowed Member States to decide
whether to enlarge the definition of protected custo-
mers to the other three categories of customer. The
first group encompasses small and medium-sized
enterprises (SMEs) connected to distribution net-
works;7 the second group, essential social services
such as educational institutions and hospitals;8 the
third group, district-heating installations to the extent
that they deliver heating to the aforementioned
customers.9 It is worth noting that the Members States
should have notified the Commission by 3 December
2011 about their choice of recognizing one or more of
the abovementioned groups as protected customers.10
4 Art. 8 of Regulation 994/2010 replaced by Art. 6 of
Regulation 2017/1938.
5 The SoS Regulation establishes that Member States
should take measures to ensure that undertakings do not
interrupt the gas supply to protected customers even in the
following circumstances: (a) extreme temperatures during a
7-day peak period occurring with a statistical probability of
once in 20 years; (b) any period of at least 30 days of
exceptionally high gas demand, occurring with a statistical
probability of once in 20 years; and (c) for a period of at
least 30 days in case of the disruption of the single largest
gas infrastructure under average winter conditions.
6 Art. 2(1) of Regulation 994/2010 replaced by Art. 2(5) of
Regulation 2017/1938.
7 Art. 2(1)(a) of Regulation 994/2010 replaced by Art.
2(5)(a) of Regulation 2017/1938.
8 Art. 2(1)(a) of Regulation 994/2010 replaced by Art.
2(5)(b) of Regulation 2017/1938.
9 Art. 2(1)(b) of Regulation 994/2010 replaced by Art.
2(5)(c) of Regulation 2017/1938.
10 The last paragraph of Art. 2 of Regulation 994/2010
replaced by Art. 6 of Regulation 2017/1938.
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In 2014, the French government enacted Decree
2014-328, which, inter alia, imposed additional obliga-
tions on gas suppliers by reviewing the definition of
protected customers. This motivated Eni and Uprigaz
to request judicial review of two aspects of the legal
act.
Firstly, Decree 2014-328 redefined ``protected cus-
tomer'' as any customer connected to the distribution
networks. By doing so, the French government
extended the entitlement to an uninterrupted gas
supply contract to customers who are not necessarily
households, SMEs or essential social services as listed
in the SoS Regulation. For Eni and Uprigaz, the
French government had acted ultra vires.
Secondly, gas suppliers operating in France are
obliged to stock a minimum volume of gas to, among
other purposes, safeguard the continuous supply of
gas to protected customers in crisis situations. Decree
2014-328 added that gas stocks corresponding to at
least 80 percent of storage rights should be held in
infrastructures located in national territory. In addi-
tion to the storage obligation, the Decree conferred
powers to the Minister to enact other regulatory
instruments to ensure that gas suppliers would comply
with their obligations towards protected customers.
Eni and Uprigaz claimed that Decree 2014-328
violated the SoS Regulation.
In these circumstances, the Conseil d'EÂtat decided
to accept the proceeding and referred the following
two questions to the ECJ.
i. First, could Member States impose on gas
suppliers' additional obligations resulting from
the redefinition of ``protected customer'' to
include customers who were not mentioned in
the SoS Regulation?
ii. Second, could a Member State impose on natural
gas suppliers the obligation of holding gas stocks
necessarily and exclusively in infrastructures
located within its territory and, at the same time,
confer powers to the Minister to take into
account other regulatory instruments to ensure
the compliance of gas suppliers with their
obligations?
III. Opinion of the Advocate General
Before answering the two questions referred by the
Conseil d'EÂtat, Advocate General Mengozzi raised a
preliminary point in law. He did so to examine the
legal issues in light of the primary purpose of the SoS
Regulation i.e. to safeguard the security of gas supply
in light of the principle of solidarity. The Advocate
General recalled that the SoS Regulation was adopted
in the aftermath of the Russia-Ukraine gas crisis in
2009, which brought unprecedented disruption to the
gas supply in the EU. The SoS Regulation repealed
Directive 2004/67/EC as a response to the needs of
adopting harmonized measures.11 For Advocate Gen-
eral Mengozzi, the new regulatory framework pro-
vided a comprehensive common approach to security
of supply and,12 to that end, established provisions
aimed at safeguarding the effective functioning of the
internal gas market in supply disruptions and crisis
situations.13 The obligation of gas suppliers towards
protected customers was, in this regard, one of several
mechanisms to ensure security of the gas supply.14
Having concluded the preliminary point, Advocate
General Mengozzi turned to answer the first question.
He did so by first assessing a preliminary objection of
inadmissibility raised by the French government. While
the referring court asked whether the Member State had
acted ultra vires by reviewing the meaning of protected
customer, the French authority contested the extent to
which Decree 2014-328 had indeed changed the defini-
tion of protected customer at all. For the French
authority, the reference to SMEs in the SoS Regulation
should be understood not only as entities with the legal
status of SMEs, but in light of the objectives of the
regulation. If so, enterprises connected to distribution
networks could be equated to SMEs for their necessarily
low gas consumption. Advocate General Mengozzi,
instead, rejected the objection of the French govern-
ment. He emphasized that the secondary legislation
aimed to protect SMEs because of their vulnerability,
rather than their average consumption.15
Given the refusal of the preliminary objection,
Advocate General Mengozzi advanced to the core
point of the first question. Despite Regulation 994/
2010 strictly defining ``protected customers'' at Article
2(1), the Advocate General considered that Article
8(2) nevertheless permits Member States to enact
additional obligations for gas suppliers for security of
supply, even though those additional obligation derive
from the unilateral definition of protected customers.16
However, the Decree would have to be subjected to
judicial review by the referred court to assess whether
its measures met three conditions: the specific condi-
tions laid down in the SoS Regulation,17 the genuine
reasons for security of gas supply,18 and the general
principle of proportionality.19
Regarding the second question, Advocate General
Mengozzi noticed that imposing an obligation to hold
minimum gas storage within French territory, per se,
violated the SoS Regulation whereby Article 8(5) of
Regulation 994/201020 unambiguously prohibits
11 Opinion, para. 23.
12 Opinion, para. 25.
13 Opinion, para. 26.
14 Opinion, para. 27.
15 Opinion, para. 77.
16 Opinion, para. 78.
17 Opinion, para. 68-74.
18 Opinion, para. 81.
19 Opinion, para. 82.
20 Now Art. 6(5) of Regulation 2017/1938.
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measures of this nature.21 As for the conferred powers
given to the Minister to enact other regulatory
instruments, Advocate General Mengozzi revealed
that there was nothing in the preliminary reference
that could have given meaning to the phrase ``other
regulatory instruments''.22 In this regard, he concluded
that it was for the referring to ascertain whether the
conferred power to the Minister to issue other
regulatory instruments could guarantee the compli-
ance of gas suppliers with their obligations at regional
and Union level.23
IV. Judgement
On 20 December 2017, the Fifth Chamber of the
European Court of Justice answered the questions of
the preliminary reference. Like the Advocate General,
the Court chose to address preliminary observations
before assessing the questions, but it did so to recall
Commission v Spain.24 In that infringement procedure,
the Court had answered questions about the margin of
discretion of the Member States with regards to the
choice of measure for safeguarding security of supply
during crises under Directive 2004/67/EC. The Court
recalled that the repealed Directive constituted a
minimum common approach to security of supply.25
In contrast, the SoS Regulation was adopted to
provide a tighter framework in order to prevent
unilateral measures issued by a Member State that
could jeopardize the proper functioning of the internal
market and the purpose of enhancing security of gas
supply.26
When the Court arrived at the first question, it
came nevertheless to the conclusions reached by
Advocate General Mengozzi. By answering the pre-
liminary objection of inadmissibility, the Court also
upheld the claim that customers connected to dis-
tribution networks were equated to SMEs. It rein-
forced that, given their vulnerability,27 the SoS
Regulation defined SMEs as protected customers. To
examine whether the Member State had acted ultra
vires, the Court claimed that it is ``apparent from the
wording'' of Article 8(2) that a Member State may
have the discretion to impose an additional obligation
on gas undertakings, including the redefining of
protected customers in the SoS Regulation.28 Like
Advocate General Mengozzi, the Court agreed that
any additional obligation should be reviewed by the
referring court, though the judgement only mentioned
the conditions set out in Article 8(2) of the SoS
Regulation.29
By answering the second question, the Court also
followed the Opinion of the Advocate General. Decree
2014-328 violated Article 8(5) when it imposed on gas
suppliers the obligation to hold 80 percent of storage
rights in infrastructure located in France.30 Moreover,
considering how Decree 2014-328 allowed the Minister
to take into account other regulatory measures, it was
left to the referred court to interpret national law and
ascertain whether the other regulatory measures could
ensure the compliance of gas suppliers with their
obligations at regional and Union level.31
V. Analyses and Comments
The judgment in Eni and Others is unlikely to be
remembered for its coherent reasoning. On the one
hand, to refuse the preliminary objection raised by the
French government, the Court evoked teleological
arguments. For the Court, SMEs are listed as
protected customers because the EU law recognizes
their vulnerability and consequently aimed to grant
protection for those specific legal entities. On the other
hand, by answering the question of whether a Member
State would have discretion to redefine the meaning of
protected customer, the Court did not hesitate to refer
to the ``wording'' of one provision of the SoS
Regulation.32 In this regard, the reasoning of the
Court shifted to a more semiotic or linguistic
interpretation. It underlined the expression ``addi-
tional obligation'' to reach the conclusion that a
Member State may impose additional obligations on
gas suppliers, even to include customers who were not
originally listed as protected customers in the defini-
tions of the SoS Regulation.
The key issue in Eni and Others is that neither the
judgment nor the opinion of the Advocate General
paid attention to the legal content of the provision that
defined protected customers. If the Court had done so,
the judgement would have likely taken additional
linguistic, systemic, and teleological arguments into
account.33 These additional arguments may, or may
21 Opinion, para. 89.
22 Opinion, para. 92.
23 Opinion, para. 94.
24 C-207/07, Commission v Spain, Judgment of the Court
(Third Chamber) of 17 July of 2008, EU:C:2008:428
25 Judgement, para. 21.
26 Judgement, para. 22.
27 Judgement, para. 31.
28 Judgement, para. 37.
29 Judgement, para. 40.
30 Judgement, para. 45.
31 Judgement, para. 47.
32 Art. 2 paragraph (1) and its points (a) and (b) of
Regulation 994/2010. Now the same provisions is read at
Art. 2 paragraph (5) and its points (a), (b), and (c), as well as
the second paragraph of Art. 6(1) of Regulation 2017/1938.
33 See Paunio, E. and Lindroos-Hovinheimo, S., ``Taking
Language Seriously: An Analysis of Linguistic Reasoning and
Its Implications in EU Law'' (2010) 16 European Law Journal
395 (three principal categories of arguments used by the ECJ
are distinguishable in its reasoning: semiotic or linguistic
arguments, systemic or contextual arguments, and dynamic or
functional arguments which include inter alia teleological
arguments). See also Sankari, S., ``Constitutional Pluralism
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not, have led the judgement to opposite conclusions.
As the Court made no reference to provisions defining
protected customers, it is left to us to assess whether
the Court got it wrong.34
If the Court had referred to the legal rule defining
``protected customers'', Article 2(1) of Regulation 994/
2010, it would have been inevitable to analyze whether
the SoS Regulation aimed at an exhaustive harmoni-
zation of the definition of protected customer, in
contrast to the minimum harmonization concluded by
the interpretation of Article 8(2). Given that the Court
neglected the provisions in Article 2(1), the judgement
missed the opportunity to touch upon the genuine
conflict of rules between the provisions listing
categories of protected customers and those setting
the Member States' margin of discretion.
The analyses and comments on Eni and Others
offered here, focus on the first referred question about
whether Member States could impose additional
obligation on gas undertakings by reviewing the
definition of ``protected customer''. In so doing, and
by allowing for Article 2(1), a broader perspective of
the issue is provided.
5.1. A Broader Justificatory Theory to the SoS
Regulation
The opinion of the Advocate General rightly begins by
observing the SoS Regulation though the lens of its
context and purposes. However, it does so by
reinforcing statements of the Recitals solely. The SoS
Regulation is described as a set of rules aiming at
imposing a tighter regulatory framework in order to
enhance the security of gas supply by avoiding
divergent implementations. This reason is, however,
a shallow explanatory argument that hides the broader
economic and social rationales behind the public
choice of protecting a group of customers in crisis
situations.
The SoS Regulation was put in force in the
aftermath of the 2009 Russia-Ukraine crisis. A cut-
off of natural gas in transit from Russia via Ukraine
led to immediate shortages in thirteen Member States:
Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Czech Republic,
Poland, Slovakia, Greece, Austria, Germany, France,
Italy, Slovenia, and Croatia.35
The headline of the New York Times on 6 January
2009 captured perfectly the reason why this breach in
the security of gas supply raised an unprecedented
alert: ``Russia Cuts Gas, and Europe Shivers''.36
Different to previous crises, the 2009 shortage of gas
reached a wide group of customers, including house-
holds, hospitals, and educational institutions. These
were individuals deprived of heating systems in a
bitterly cold January at the peak of the winter. This
fact matters in grasping why the SoS Regulation
introduced the legal concept of protected customers.
Regulation 994/2010 revoked Directive 2004/67/EC
to put in place a much tighter regulatory framework.37
The EU legislator recognized that national measures
developed unilaterally by the Member States jeopar-
dized the effective functioning of the international
market, the solidarity among Member States, and the
security of gas supply in a crisis situation. In order to
do so, the SoS Regulation imposed a tighter regulatory
framework with regards to not one, but several
measures.
The SoS Regulation imposes, for instance, obliga-
tions to establish long-term planning of investments in
new gas infrastructures to better integrate poorly
interconnected regions. Hence, natural gas could flow
through more alternative routes. It also determines
actions of the Emergency Plans beforehand, which
includes the obligation on gas undertakings of
releasing gas stocks located on a not-affected Member
State to rescue those customers situated on the
affected Member States. Having in mind the SoS
Regulation as a body of rules, the obligation of
guaranteeing the uninterrupted gas supply to pro-
tected customers is one among other regulatory
mechanism to ensure the security of supply.
The SoS Regulation shares responsibility for
security of gas supply with gas undertakings, alongside
with national, regional and European authorities,38
and imposes a set of detailed obligations on these
market players. Among those obligations, gas suppli-
ers must ensure an uninterrupted gas supply to a
selected group of protected customers in crisis situa-
tions. At this point, there is a need for a further
explanation about the economic, moral, and legal
rationale behind the necessity of choosing a group of
customers to the detriment of others in a gas supply
crisis.39
The technical and economic dilemma is the follow-
ing. A supply crisis occurs when there is a mismatch
between gas supply and demand. For example, a
disruption of a large gas pipeline could lead to an
abrupt decrease of gas flow to a specific region. This
cont.
and Judicial Adjudication: On Legal Reasoning, Minimal-
ism and Silence by the Court of Justice'' in Gareth Davies
and Matej Avbelj (eds), Research Handbook on Legal
Pluralism and EU Law (Edward Elgar Publishing 2018).
34 Op. cit., supra note 2.
35 Commission, ``Commission Staff Working Document
Accompanying document to the Proposal for a Regulation
for the European Parliament and of the Council concerning
measures to safeguard security of gas supply and repealing
Directive 2004/67/EC'' (Communication) SEC(2009) 977
final, p. 4.
36 Kramer, Andrew E., ``Russia Cuts Gas, and Europe
Shivers'', The New York Times (New York, 6 January 2009).
37 Recital 5 of Regulation 994/2010.
38 Art. 3(1) of Regulation 994/2010 replaced by Art. 3(1) of
Regulation 2017/1938.
39 Applied to general theories of regulation, see chapter on
Congestion by Frischmann, B.M., Infrastructure: The Social
Value of Shared Resources (Oxford University Press 2012).
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decrease of gas supply could be solved by releasing gas
from stocks, if they exist, or by the response of
neighbouring areas not affected by the cut-off. The
reliance on the latter solution still depends on the
infrastructure that interconnects affected and non-
affected regions. When those alternatives are insuffi-
cient to rebalance supply and demand in areas affected
by the disruption of gas supply, gas demand must be
quickly reduced, by disconnecting customers from the
network. Gas undertakings may or may not be liable
for disconnecting customers insofar as they do not
contribute to the disruption of the gas flow. The
answer to the liability issue, nevertheless, differs
according to the legal regime governing the contract
relation between suppliers and customers, if negligence
or strict liability.
In addition to the liability, it is common to see
regulatory frameworks addressing distributive issues in
crisis situations as long as gas markets have inelastic
demand. Inelastic demand means that end-costumers
cannot or do not respond to gas supply crisis
immediately. Even if the gas price rises, households still
need to switch on their heating systems. Industries,
moreover, are not informed of unforeseen gas supply
crisis by the nature of crisis itself. As a result, the
decrease of gas supply or price rise does not cause the
short-term reaction to declining demand, as one expects
as reaction of markets with elastic demand. To
(re)balance the gas flow in the pipelines, governance
regimes commonly define who will be cut-off first. There
are different governance mechanisms in this regard. For
instance, a market mechanism would leave suppliers to
decide whom. Suppliers could negotiate with customers
a contractual right to have an interruptible supply of gas
in crisis situations, which implies that the latter pays a
price for the contractual right.
However, there are objections against this kind of
market mechanism that are based on moral and ethical
considerations.40 Interrupting the gas supply to a
hospital and, at the same time, not interrupting the
supply to a factory is likely to harm the moral and
ethical principles of a society. Having this in mind, it is
expectable that a regulatory agency chooses a group of
customers who cannot be disconnected or, at least, will
be the last group disconnected from the network.
In the EU, the aforementioned dilemma faced by
regulators gains an additional layer of complexity.
Suppose that, before the SoS Regulation, a Member
State had granted an uninterruptable gas supply to a
group of customers equivalent to 50 percent of its
domestic market and, moreover, imposed storage
obligation on gas undertakings. It is plausible that
the national measure would have undermined the
functioning of the internal market, the solidarity
between Member States, and maybe even competition.
Having in mind this contextualization of the SoS
Regulation, one could better understand the technical,
economic, and moral reasons for the strict definition
of customers protected by regulation.
5.2. List of Protected Customer Regarded as
Exhaustive
The SoS Regulation defined protected customers in its
list of definitions. However, it did so in an unusual
way in comparison to other secondary legislation. If
Article 2(1) of Regulation 994/201041 is read in
isolation from other provisions, one might notice that
the SoS Regulation defines protected customers by
enclosing customers in general into three different
categories. The first category encompasses all house-
holds connected to the distribution network. These are
necessarily protected customers as neither Member
States, nor households connected by themselves can
wave their rights. In contrast, the second and third
categories of customers refer to a sort of harmoniza-
tion that resembles an opt-in or opt-out system. The
regulation leaves Member States to decide whether
including one or more categories of customers in the
definition of protected customer, a decision that
needed to be notified to the Commission by a specific
day. Besides households, Member States could have
decided to include customers in the point (a), SMEs
connected to distribution networks and also essential
social services; and or point (b), district-heating
installations that delivered heating to households and
customers listed in the point (a).
It is undisputable that the SoS Regulation applies
an unusual harmonization standard. Member States'
margin of discretion seems confined to the possibility
of answering yes-or-no to the inclusion of predeter-
mined categories of customers to the definition of
protected customers. To make things even more
complicated, Regulation 994/2010 stated this harmo-
nization standard within its list of definitions.42 A list
of definitions in secondary legislation is likely to be
ancillary to the interpretation of legal rules, rather
than to state reasons for actions. Nevertheless, had the
legislator done so, there are no reasons for not
referring to those legal rules as part of a broader
systemic body of rules.
By reading Article 2(1) of Regulation 994/2010 by
itself, one could reach the conclusion that the SoS
Regulation can be regarded as an exhaustive list of
possible protected customers. Some EU legislation
expressly acknowledges the exhaustive character of
this provision and, when they do so, are indisputable
cases of exhaustive harmonization. The SoS Regula-
tion, instead, does not use the term ``exhaustive list''
40 Sovacool, B.K. and Dworkin, M.H., Global Energy
Justice: Problems, Principles, and Practices (Cambridge
University Press 2014), pp. 353±356.
41 Now Art. 2(5) of Regulation 2017/1938.
42 It is worth noting that Regulation 2017/1938 did not
substantially reform the text of the legal provision dealing
with the Member States' choice to include predetermined
categories of customers as protected customers, but it did
reallocate the provision from Article 2(1) to Article 6(1).
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expressly. In contrast, when express indication is
absent, it is for the ECJ to decide whether the
regulatory provision can be regarded as exhaustive
or not. There are precedents at ECJ ruling that
comprehensive and detailed regulatory schemes are
more likely to be regarded as exhaustive.43 Once the
ECJ rules that a certain regulation has laid down an
exhaustive system, Member States cannot unilaterally
impose stricter standards because their action is pre-
empted.44
Eni and Others does not refer to the provision listing
the categories of protected customers. Had the
referred court requested the ruling of Article 2(1) of
Regulation 994/2010, the judgement would have
answered whether the definition of protected customer
effects an exhaustive harmonization. Having the Court
not referred to Article 2(1), it remains for us to
speculate how the Court would have ruled if it had
done so. By considering the three principal categories
of arguments used by ECJ in its reasoning - linguistic,
systemic, and teleological arguments,45 we argue the
Court would have inescapably ruled in favour of
exhaustive harmonization.
Firstly, linguistic arguments refer to legal reasoning
that takes into account the wording or meaning of a
contentious provision in a legal text to reach a
judgment.46 SoS Regulation establishes that Member
States ``should notify the Commission whether they
intend to include points (a) and/or (b) in their
definition of protected customers''.47 One could argue
that, according to the wording of the regulation,
Member States ``intent to include'' other customers in
the definition of protected customers could have done
so by choosing point (a), point (b), or both. In this
case there would be no room for further discretion.
Secondly, systemic or contextual arguments suggest
that a legal rule has to be interpreted in accordance to
a large body of rules, as part of a legal system.48 As
mentioned above, the SoS Regulation repealed the
Directive 2004/67/EC to establish a tighter regulatory
framework. This objective can be read in the recital (5)
of Regulation 994/2010 and was restated in Eni and
Others. If the definition of protected customer had
been interpreted as an exhaustive list, the arguments
would have been coherent to the other legal rules in
the regulation that enhance a tighter governance
regime at EU level, so well as to the motivation to
repeal the Directive, to avoid that national measures
jeopardized the proper functioning of the internal
market and the security of supply.
Thirdly, teleological arguments are a legal inter-
pretation that takes as its starting-point the purpose of
the text in question i.e. the values.49 The contextual
arguments already anticipated the purpose of the SoS
Regulation. Being its purpose to ensure security of gas
supply without distorting competition, the functions
or internal market, and the solidarity among the
Member States. Considering the dilemmas involved in
the regulatory choice of whether and who might be
protected customers, one could argue that, in princi-
ple, the unilateral enlargement of right to an inter-
ruptible supply of gas to customers that are not
necessarily vulnerable could compromise the contin-
uous gas supply of those who are listed as protected
customers by the SoS Regulation. Furthermore,
considering the interconnected European gas market,
enlarging the entitlement to be protected customers in
one Member State could compromise the capacity of
gas undertakings operating in another neighbouring
State to ensure uninterrupted gas supply to those
protected customers. Not only the security of gas
supply of a network system at regional and Union
level would be at risk, but above all the principle of
solidarity among Member States.
5.3. Exhaustive v. Minimum Harmonization: the
(Non)balanced Conflict of Norms
Whilst the Court said nothing about the provision
defining protected customers, it devoted a sizable
proportion of the judgement to analyse the supply
standard. The SoS Regulation uses the term ``supply
standard'' for heading all the rules regulating the
obligations of gas suppliers towards protected custo-
mers. Paragraph (1) sets the obligation of under-
takings to provide an uninterruptible gas supply to
protected customers. It is then followed by three
points stating the conditions in which the obligations
43 C-255/86 Commission v Belgium EU:C:1988:63, and C-
278/85 Commission v Denmark EU:C:1987:439. See also
Arena A, ``The Twin Doctrine of Primacy and Pre-emption,
in SchuÈ tze, R. and Tridimas, T. (eds), Oxford Principles of
European Union Law: Volume 1: The European Union Legal
Order (Oxford University Press 2018), pp. 331±333.
44 Barnard, C., The Substantive Law of the EU: The Four
Freedoms (Fifth edition, Oxford University Press 2016), pp.
582±583.
45 Paunio, E. and Lindroos-Hovinheimo, S., op. cit. supra n.
32, p. 400. See also KomaÂ rek J, ``Legal Reasoning in EU
Law'', The Oxford Handbook of European Union Law
(Oxford University Press 2015), p. 50.
46 Conway, G., The Limits of Legal Reasoning and the
European Court of Justice (Cambridge University Press
2012), p. 248; and Hartley. T.C., ``The European Court,
Judicial Objectivity and the Constitution of the European
Union'' [1998] The Law Quarterly Review. See also in
general theory of legal interpretation, Bix, B.H., ``Legal
Interpretation and The Philosophy Of Language'' [2012]
The Oxford Handbook of Language and Law; and Wrú-
blewski, J., ``Legal Language and Legal Interpretation''
(1985) 4 Law and Philosophy 239.
47 The last paragraph of Art. 2 of Regulation 994/2010
replaced by Art. 6 of Regulation 2017/1938.
48 Paunio, E. and Lindroos-Hovinheimo, S., op. cit. supra n.
32, p. 404.
49 Maduro, M., ``Interpreting European Law: Judicial
Adjudication in a Context of Constitutional Pluralism''
(2007) 1 European Journal of Legal Studies. Paunio, E. and
Lindroos-Hovinheimo, S., op. cit. supra n. 32, p. 405.
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are triggered and, if so, for how long they must be
performed. Paragraph (2), instead, regulates the
Member States' discretion to unilaterally enact further
obligations for gas undertakings. ``Any increased
supply standard going beyond the 30-day period'' or
``any additional obligation imposed for reasons of
security of gas supply'' could not undermine the
functions of the internal market, the purposes of
security of gas supply, competition, and solidarity
among Member States.
The judgment in Eni and Others is meticulous in
interpreting paragraph (2) of the provisions on supply
standards in the SoS Regulation. Indeed, the Court
referred to the wording of each sentence. For the
Court, the first sentence of paragraph (2), ``any
increased supply standard going beyond the 30-day
period'', allows Members States to only extend the
time-clause in which the obligation must be per-
formed. By contrast, the Court understood the second
sentence of paragraph (2), ``any additional obligation
imposed for reasons of security of gas supply'', to
mean at a Member States' broader discretion.
Before Eni and Others, it was indisputable that the
Member States had the discretion to impose an
additional obligation on gas undertakings to ensure
their compliance with supply standards. However, if
this discretion could be also extended to the authority
of redefining the list of protected customers, this is the
key question at stake as mentioned above. Eni and
Others itself refers to the national measures that
impose on gas undertakings the duty of holding a
minimum gas stock for a certain time during winter
seasons. It is worth noting that the duty of holding a
gas stock is a means to the end of guaranteeing the
compliance with the supply standards. The French
measure illustrates how a Member State could exercise
this margin of discretion established in the second
sentence of Article 8(2) without changing the defini-
tion of protected costumers. However, the judgment in
Eni and Others underlined the term ``additional
obligations'' to consider as lawful any unilateral
protection measure, including uninterrupted gas sup-
ply to customers not originally listed as protected
customers in the SoS Regulation. By not referring to
the provision that exhaustively defined protected
customers the judgement wrongly implied a minimum
harmonization standard for an apparent exhaustive
list of protected customers in the SoS Regulation.
There are two issues that must be raised regarding
the Court's reasoning. First, Eni and Others recognizes
the lawfulness of additional protective measures by
applying a narrow and shallow argument in its
reasoning.50 Such judicial minimalism has already
been subjected to criticism elsewhere.51 Moreover,
the judgment does not provide a systemic reading of
the SoS regulation in so far as it fails to refer to other
provisions regulating the same matter. Nor did it give
due attention to the context in which SoS Regulation
was approved to establish a tighter regulatory frame-
work. Furthermore, Eni and Others could have solved
the conflict of rules in the SoS Regulation. One the one
hand, the SoS Regulation generally allows Member
States to impose additional obligations on gas
suppliers for security of gas supply. One the other
hand, with regards to the specific obligation of
providing an uninterrupted gas supply to protected
customers, the legislator opted to list customers
entitled to be protected. Regardless of whether the
Court applied the maxim of lex spcialis derogat legi
generali or a more ``contextualist'' reasoning, Eni and
Others could have reached the opposite conclusion.
VI.Final Remarks
The judgement in Eni and Others is interesting in many
aspects. When the Court reassures us that SMEs are
protected customers, given their vulnerability, it sheds
light upon the social values inherent in the SoS
Regulation. It serves as a counter-argument to those
who have denied the existence of social values in EU
law.52 Eni and Others could also serve as an alert to the
Commission's failure in monitoring the implementa-
tion of EU law by Member States. Although Decree
2014-328 was obviously in violation of the SoS
Regulation for restraining the location of gas stocks
within France territory, the claim of unlawfulness was
brought to the surface via private enforcement before
national courts, rather than infringement procedure,
as one would expect.
Notwithstanding the abovementioned aspects of
Eni and Others, the comments on the case focus on the
legal arguments of the Court that directly impact the
harmonization regime of the SoS Regulation and, at
worst, challenge the precedents at ECJ on exhaustive
harmonization. The analyses and comments on Eni
and Others raise two critical points.
Firstly, Eni and Others recognizes Member States'
discretion to unilaterally amend an exhaustive list of
protected customers despite the judgment making no
reference to the provision that actually addresses the
exhaustive list. Rather, the preliminary ruling restrains
its reasoning to a shallow linguistic argument of a
provision generally addressing Member States' discre-
tion. Eni and Others lacks analytical strength in
reading the SoS Regulation as a systemic body of
50 About narrow and shallow judicial decisions, cf. Sunstein,
C., ``Beyond Judicial Minimalism'' [2008] Law & Economics
Working Papers. See the minimalist argument applied to
ECJ's judgments in Sankari, S., op cit. supra n. 32, pp. 317±
321.
51 About the emptiness of linguistic arguments, cf. Paunio,
E. and Lindroos-Hovinheimo, S., op. cit. supra n.32, pp.
406±7. See also Maduro, M., op. cit. supra n. 48.
52 Davies, G., ``Democracy and Legitimacy in the Shadow
of Purposive Competence'' (2015) 21 European Law Journal
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legal norms. As a result, the effect of an exhaustively
harmonized standard for security of gas supply,
intended by the SoS Regulation after the 2009
Russia-Ukraine crisis, moved backward to the mini-
mum harmonization existing in the previous regime.
Secondly, Eni and Others could be perceived as a
challenge to the precedents at ECJ that recognizes the
effects of exhaustive harmonization. Whilst the Court
has long recognized the effects of pre-emption of EU
legislation that exhaustively regulates a matter, the
judgement in Eni and Others indirectly undermined it.
The core issue in Eni and Others is that the Court
does so by not referring to the apparent exhaustive
list. Whether the list of protected customers is or is
not an exhaustive list, the Court missed the oppor-
tunity to say so. One way or another, having in mind
the lack of analytical strength of the judgement, Eni
and Others should not be taken as a precedent to
challenge any exhaustive harmonized standards in
EU law.
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